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Abstract 
A key problem facing monetary policy makers is determining whether serious 
financial instability is present. Periods of financial instability are linked with low 
investors’ risk appetite (or in other words high risk aversion). Two different 
measures of investors’ risk aversion are used: (a) the implied volatility from the 
Eurostoxx 50 index (VSTOX) and (b) an index based on principal component 
analysis applied to risk premia of several stock portfolios in the eurozone area 
(12 countries) with different fundamental and size characteristics. By using an 
unrestricted VAR model and impulse response analysis for the period January 
1999 to August 2007, our results show that a shock in the risk aversion indicator 
affects negatively future real activity in the eurozone in a similar way to an 
exchange rate shock. The ECB reacts significantly to a risk aversion shock by 
reducing the interest rate in order to provide liquidity. Moreover, assuming 
rational expectations and using a forward-looking specification of the Taylor 
rule, we found that investors’ risk aversion affects the ECB behavior as the 
leading indicator of future economic activity but not as an independent argument 
for the monetary policy. It views price stability and economic and financial 
stability as highly complementary and mutually consistent objectives to be 
pursued within a unified policy framework. 
 
JEL classification: E44, E52, G0  
Keywords: European Central Bank, monetary policy; Taylor rule; transmission 
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1. Introduction 
Since the introduction of the common currency in 1999 the degree of financial 
market integration has increased dramatically among the members of the 
eurozone. Moreover, global stock indices have been constructed including 
companies from countries belonging to the eurozone and international investors 
direct their interest to these indices. 
Equity markets are an active alternative source of corporate finance 
compared with traditional lending via banks. These days, more and more 
companies raise funds via equity markets to finance their investment projects, 
which affect real economic activity. If managers of risky firms are cognizant of 
their investors’ required compensation for risk, an increase in the risk premium 
should raise the “hurdle rate” that managers use to evaluate new investments. 
This can lead to quashing many investments already planned and reducing the 
number of feasible projects, with significant consequences for the real economy. 
As a consequence the study of investors’ risk behavior in stock markets could 
provide possible signals about future real economic activity.  
Broad literature originating in the 1990s documents, using mainly U.S. 
data, that there is a link between risk premia in stock market and macroeconomic 
variables. Among others Kandel and Stambaugh (1990), Chen (1991) and Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2001) indicate that expected excess returns vary 
countercyclically with current business conditions.   
Recently, Liew and Vassalou (2000) and Fuerst (2006) measured risk 
premia implied by the Fama–French asset pricing model and found that 
innovations in some of these premia are informative about future real economic 
activity in the U.S. Fuerst focused on size-related premia without providing 
arguments for the poor information contained in other premia about economic 
activity. Each risk premium in these studies reflects the attitude toward risk of a 
specific category of investors. 
However, according to Kumar and Persaud (2002), investors share a 
common but changing appetite for risk. All theses implying that information 
about economic activity containing investors’ appetite for risk greater than the 
risk premia in general should be investigated.    
In our study risk premia on indices portfolios are decomposed within the 
framework of asset pricing models into a “price of risk,” which is common to all 
assets, and a “quantity of risk,” which is specific to each asset.1 The relation 
between “price of risk” and economic activity is investigated within the well-
established framework of monetary policy vector autoregression. 
Risk aversion is often considered to correspond to the “price of risk” 
obtained in this way and has a dual use in the literature. On the one hand, in its 
narrow sense, the term refers to the risk aversion coefficient present in the 
consumer’s utility function. This parameter depends on the economic agent 
profile and it is constant over time. On the other hand, in its broader view – 
which is the one adopted in this paper – it is a significant factor in the formation 
of asset prices and makes it possible to reflect investor sentiment with regard to 
risk in an ever-changing environment.2 This definition has the advantage that it 
constitutes the opposite of the concept of “risk appetite” frequently mentioned by 
market operators (Kumar and Persaud, 2002; Gai and Vause, 2004). Goudert and 
Gex (2006) find that risk aversion tends to increase before stock market crises. In 
light of these findings and the fact that there is significant correlation between 
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 See Cochrane (2001). 
2
 Kumar and Persaud (2002) developed an analytical framework for defining investor risk 
appetite based on the price of risk. 
stock market crises and economic activity, we investigate the relation between 
risk aversion measures and economic activity, which is not given particular 
attention in academic literature.  
The paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. It is the first study to 
our knowledge that investigates the relationship between measures of investors’ 
risk aversion and economic activity for eurozone aggregate data. Moreover, it 
compares the effect on economic activity of shocks in risk aversion indices with 
monetary policy shocks. It therefore provides useful implications for policy 
makers about the significance of investors’ risk perception in conducting 
economic policy in the broad eurozone. More specifically, the role of investors’ 
risk aversion in the ECB reaction function is investigated. 
Over the recent years there has been an increasing amount of literature 
that investigates empirically the ECB reaction function (see among others 
Fourcans and Vranceanu, 2002; Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2004; Ullrich, 2003; 
Sauer and Sturm, 2007). However, none of these researchers mentioned the 
importance of financial stability in conducting monetary policy. This paper tries 
to shed light in this direction. The Central Bank’s liquidity may be the answer to 
the increased level of risk aversion from investors in the name of financial 
stability. However, the recent financial crisis teaches us that the magnitude and 
the duration of this provided liquidity may have negative effects on the economy 
depending on commercial banks’ behavior. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 there is a 
literature review. Section 3 provides information about the data and the main 
methodology of our research. In the fourth Section, estimation results are 
presented and discussed. Finally, the last Section concludes with some general 
comments. 
 
2. Literature Review  
At the beginning of the 1990s Kandel and Stambaugh provided empirical 
evidence of the countercyclical and leading behavior of the risk premium. They 
argue that, at business cycle peaks, when current consumption and output are 
high, investors have a relatively lower marginal utility for consumption and 
therefore require less compensation for bearing risk. At business cycle troughs, 
the risk premium is at its greatest due to the fact that investors suffer from lower 
consumption and anticipate higher future consumption levels and volatility.  
Two years later, Fama and French (1992) initiated one of the main 
research topics in asset pricing in the 1990s. They state that the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) should be extended by including two more risk premium 
factors related to size and relative distress. More specifically, in a series of their 
papers (1995, 1996, 1998), they argue that a risk factor related to book-to-market 
called High Minus Low (HML) and a risk factor related to size called Small 
Minus Big (SMB) act as state variables in the context of Merton’s (1973) 
Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM). In such a case, risk premia 
related to these two factors should capture information about fundamental risk in 
the economy that affects the investment opportunity set. 
According to Fama and French (1992, 1996) and Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), U.S. firms that have a high book-to-market equity ratio, earnings-to-price 
ratio or cash flow-to-price ratio, known as value stocks, present a strong 
premium in average returns. This value premium is associated with relative 
distress. This premium arises because the market undervalues distressed (value) 
stocks and overvalues growth stocks (Haugen, 1995). When these pricing errors 
are corrected value stocks have high returns and growth stocks low returns. In 
other words, value stocks are usually undervalued due to the persistent low future 
earnings they tend to have and the great optimism about economic conditions 
that leads investors to buy growth stocks. However, in periods of high economic 
uncertainty, all investors sell growth stocks and buy value stocks, resulting in an 
increase in the HML risk factor.  
Hardouvelis and Wizman (1992) find that the risk premium for size 
shows strong countercyclical variation, implying that this size effect may be a 
significant propagation mechanism of business cycles. Moreover, Fuerst (2006) 
argues that this small firm risk premium, indicating small firm access to capital, 
plays a crucial role in the monetary transmission mechanism to the real economy. 
Liew and Vassalou (2000) find that SMB and HML portfolios do well in good 
times and poorly in bad times. This is exactly the opposite of what a 
consumption risk-averse investor desires and justifies risk premia on these 
factors. Fuerst (2006) indicates that shocks to the premium related to small firms 
induce responses in the real economy similar to those from monetary policy 
disturbances. 
Other studies focusing on the relationship between investment decisions 
and risk premia are those by Lamont (2000) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2002). 
The former use Q theory and a consumption–wealth ratio to proxy for the future 
risk premium and then analyze the link between this proxy and future long-term 
investment. The latter argues that actual investing occurs with a lag following a 
change in the discount rate and induces a negative correlation between risk 
premia and investments. 
Another interesting area in the literature is the one referring to the relation 
between risk aversion indices and financial crises. According to Goudert and Gex 
(2006), risk aversion tends to increase before a financial crisis. However, the 
measure of risk aversion is a good leading indicator of stock market crises, but is 
less so for currency crises.  
According to Bernanke and Gertler (1999), asset price crashes in the U.S. 
have inflicted sustained damage on the economy only in cases where the 
monetary policy remained unresponsive to actively reinforced deflationary 
pressures. Therefore, one development that has already concentrated the minds of 
policy makers is an apparent increase in financial stability, of which one 
important dimension is the increased volatility of asset prices. Central banks 
should view price stability as highly complementary and mutually consistent 
objectives, to be pursued within a unified policy framework. 
The inflation targeting implies that interest rates will tend to increase 
during (inflationary) asset price booms and fall during (deflationary) asset price 
busts, and reduces the potential for financial panics produced from trying to 
stabilize the asset price per se.  
Moreover, Mishkin and White (2002) argue that stock market crashes that 
may be attributed to expectations of an economic decline or a loss of “irrational 
exuberance” have an independent effect on economic activity. The financial 
shock is transmitted via the effect that a large loss in wealth has on consumer 
spending and through effects on the cost of capital on investment. Monetary 
authorities should follow an expansionary policy by increasing liquidity in order 
to reduce the financial instability that produces additional stress on the economy. 
However, the recent financial crisis provides evidence that increased liquidity 
lasting a long time in the market may affect the risk perception of banks and have 
serious implications concerning systemic risk. 
 
3. Theoretical Underpinnings: Price and Quantity of Risk  
Based on asset pricing theory, the risk premium can be decomposed into 
the quantity and the price of risk. The latter is common across assets or portfolios 
and is frequently related in the literature to investors’ behavior to risk.  
By considering the CCAPM framework in a very simple form, we 
assume that there is a single risky asset, two periods, constant consumer prices 
and a utility function that is separable over time. The investor must therefore 
maximize his utility by choosing an optimal quantity of assets to buy in the first 
period. The optimization program to be solved is as follows: 
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We denote consumption as ct in t, non-financial revenue as yt, the price of the 
asset as pt, gross income from the asset xt+1 and the quantity of the asset bought 
in t as ξ, and δ is the intertemporal discount factor, which captures the 
consumer’s preference the present. Then the price of the asset is deduced from 
the first-order conditions: 
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The asset price expressed in Eq. (2) can be interpreted as the expected 
income 1+tx , discounted by a discount factor, denoted as 1+tm  and referred to as 
the “stochastic discount factor”: 
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To express the risk premia, it is necessary to derive the gross return on the asset. 
To do so we divide the income by the price: 
][1 11 ++= ttt RmE .       (4) 
By definition the risk-free asset (Rf) does not vary with the states of the world 
and it follows that: 
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By using Eq. (4) and (5) the risk premium can be written as follows:3 
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Assuming that there are n assets or portfolio indices in our case (i=1 to n), the 
risk premium can be decomposed as follows:  
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The risk premium can be written in the form: 
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We can consider that λm is the price of risk, which is common to all assets, and 
that βi,m is the specific quantity of risk associated with each asset. Often, the price 
of risk λm is regarded as corresponding to risk aversion. 
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 4. Data and Methodology 
In the first step of our methodology we construct indices portfolios based 
on fundamental characteristics of firms in the eurozone. Secondly, by adopting 
principal component analysis on the risk premia of these indices portfolios, we 
estimate a measure of risk aversion. Thirdly, within a VAR framework, we 
compare the effects of monetary policy on industrial production with the effects 
of our risk aversion indicators on this same measure. Finally, we investigate the 
role of this risk aversion indicator in the Central Bank’s setting of the interest 
rate in a Taylor-rule framework. 
Risk Aversion Measures  
The sample size begins with the introduction of the European Union unit. 
Monthly stock market data for the broad eurozone4 area, during the period 
1999M1–2007M8, are taken from “Stoxx Limited,”5 a joint venture between 
Deutsche Börse AG, Dow Jones & Company and SWX Group (Swiss Exchange) 
providing special style and sector indices.  
The DJ STOXX Total Market Index (TMI) for the eurozone covers 95 
percent of the free float market capitalization of the respective investable stock 
universe. The size classification groups companies of this index into three 
different size ranges: Large, Medium and Small. The companies belonging to 
each size index are grouped further by investment styles into growth or value, 
producing the following indices portfolios of our main concern: Large Cap 
                                                 
4
 Eurozone: companies incorporated and listed in the eurozone (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) that are 
trading in euros. 
5
 www.stoxx.com 
Growth (LG), Mid Cap Growth (MG), Small Cap Growth (SG) and Large Cap 
Value (LV), Mid Cap Value (MV), Small Cap Value (SV).  
The Dow Jones STOXX style classification process groups together 
companies with similar value and growth style characteristics. The style 
characteristics of each stock are determined by analyzing six factors – two 
projected and four historical: projected and trailing P/E ratios, projected and 
trailing earnings growth, price/book (P/B) ratio and dividend yield.6  
The common trend in the risk premia of indices portfolios can be 
interpreted as the price of risk if certain conditions are met: notably that it 
increases with each risk premium and it is correlated with other measures of 
investor risk tolerance such as the volatility indices from the stock markets. 
The search for common sources of variation has a long history in the 
asset pricing literature. Ross’s (1976) APT model, which is based on the no-
arbitrage argument, shows that the systematic portion of equity returns can be 
expressed as a linear function of a set of “factors.” However, APT specifies 
neither their number nor their nature. This leads to the use of statistical methods, 
such as principal component analysis (PCA), to identify them.  
In order to estimate a risk aversion measure principal component analysis 
is applied to the risk premia of our equity portfolios in order to identify a 
common factor in their variations. More specifically, an indicator referred to 
hereafter as “Comp1” is constructed exactly like a weighted average of risk 
premia, the weighting being given by the PCA on the risk premia of indices 
portfolios (LG, MG, SG, LV, MV, SV). The risk premia have been chosen so as 
to be representative of the changes observed across the stock market as a whole. 
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 The style indices are reviewed on a semi-annual basis in March and September. Details 
concerning the construction of style indices can be found at the website www.stoxx.com. 
Sløk and Kennedy (2004) use principal component analysis to identify a 
common trend in the risk premia on stock and bond markets in developed and 
emerging countries. They argue that the variance explained weighted average of 
the first two common factors is strongly correlated with the OECD’s leading 
indicator of industrial production and a measure of global liquidity, and can be 
used as a measure of risk aversion. McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) find similar 
results for 15 emerging market countries.  
As an alternative measure of risk aversion we use a volatility index 
constructed from the option market. Volatility is a measure of the level of 
uncertainty prevailing in certain markets. Implied volatility represents the 
estimates and assumptions of market participants involved in a trade, on the basis 
of a given option price.  
Market analysts usually try to estimate changes in investors’ perception 
of risk by looking at gold prices and the Swiss franc exchange rate, which 
increase over periods of uncertainty. However, in 1993 a more direct measure of 
fear, a new volatility index (VIX), was created by the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE), which equals the implied volatility on the S&P 500. Over the 
last years, a similar measure for the eurozone has been presented, known as the 
DJ EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX).  
The underling asset is the DJ EURO STOXX 50 index that measures the 
performance of the eurozone equity market. It covers the 50 largest sector leaders 
in the eurozone based on free float market capitalization. The options contract on 
this index is one of the products of Eurex with the highest trading volume. The 
VSTOXX is calculated on the basis of 8 expiry months with a maximum time to 
expiry of 2 years.7 Since we have 2 measures of risk aversion we proceed to the 
second step of our methodology by investigating the relation between these 
measures and economic activity.   
Risk Aversion Measures within a VAR Framework 
By following the previous findings of Patelis (1997), Thorbecke (1997, 
2000) and Fuerst (2006), which show a link between monetary policy and stock 
returns, we cast our analysis within the well-established framework of monetary 
policy vector autoregressions. 
 The benefit of this approach is the direct comparability of the effects of 
monetary policy on industrial production with the effects of our risk aversion 
indicators on this same measure. Monetary models analyze the impact on the 
economy of changes in the cost of borrowing. Similarly, we analyze the impact 
on the economy of changes in the risk aversion indicator, which makes raising 
funds through the capital market not an easy task. 
Our system is essentially a standard monetary model augmented with a 
risk aversion indicator. As with many common monetary models, we achieve 
identification by assuming a lower triangular matrix for the contemporaneous 
interactions among the variables (i.e., we use a Choleski decomposition). We 
estimate the following system as vector autoregressions in levels and analyze its 
impulse responses:  
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,       (10) 
where ty  is a p-vector of industrial production, the inflation variable, the risk 
aversion variable, the overnight interest rate (EONIA8) and the nominal effective 
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 This index, jointly developed by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Börse, does not measure implied 
volatilities of at-the-money DJ EURO STOXX 50 options but the implied variance across all 
options of a given time to expiry (www.stoxx.com ).  
exchange rate of the euro9; µ  is a vector of drift constants; Γ is the pp×  matrix 
of the coefficients at lag i; and ),(~ Σ0nidtε  is the vector of innovations. The 
number of three lags for the system is specified based on likelihood ratio tests.
    
The Taylor Rule and the Risk Aversion Measures 
Price stability over the medium term is the main goal of the European 
Central Bank. Because monetary policy operates with a lag, a successful 
stabilization policy therefore needs to be forward looking. In order to investigate 
ECB interest rate setting we use a simple rule for monetary policy, building on 
the experience of Taylor (1993). The effectiveness of the Taylor rule in 
stabilizing open economies under exchange rate model uncertainty has been 
presented recently by Leitemo and Soderstrom (2005).  
As an enhancement of the standard Taylor rule we follow Clarida et al. 
(1998) and use a forward-looking rule, where the target interest rate *ti  is set in 
response to the expected inflation and output gap. At this point we should 
mention that many economists argue that central bankers focus their attention on 
core inflation more than on a broader measure of inflation. This is mainly due to 
their belief that energy shocks have a temporary character (see Figure 1).   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
In line with Clarida et al. (1998) we take the industrial production index 
for the euro area, apply a standard Hodrick–Prescott filter10 and calculate our 
measure of the output gap as the deviation of logarithm of the actual industrial 
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 We measure actual monetary policy by the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) lending 
rate on the money market, which is the European equivalent of the Federal Funds rate for the 
United States. 
9
 Monthly data for the period 1999M1–2007M8 obtained from Eurostat and the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database. 
10
 The smoothing parameter set at λ=14400. 
production from its trend. Expectations are based on the available information set 
Ω at time t and reach k and l periods into the future, respectively: 
 ttltytktt yEEai εβpiβpi +Ω⋅+Ω⋅+= ++ )|()|( .   (11) 
However, it is commonly observed that, especially since the early 1990s, central 
banks worldwide tend to move policy interest rates in small steps without 
reversing direction quickly (see e.g. Amato and Laubach, 1999; Rudebusch, 
2002). To capture this so-called interest rate smoothing, Eq. (11) is viewed as the 
mechanism by which the target interest rate *ti  is determined. The actual interest 
rate partially adjusts to this target according to 1*)1( −⋅+⋅−= ttt iii ρρ , where ρ is 
the smoothing parameter. By following Eq. 11, interest rate smoothing and 
assuming rational expectations, the following equation is estimated using the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) for k=12: 
ttttytktt iyEEai ερβpiβρρ pi +⋅+Ω⋅+Ω⋅⋅−+⋅−= −+ 1)]|()|([)1()1( . (12) 
Another way to include forward-looking elements in the analysis is to use 
survey data information to proxy business cycle movements. Survey data are 
available immediately and contain questions regarding the future development of 
economic activity. On the contrary GDP data are frequently revised data and they 
are published with a time lag. Orphanides (2001) shows that estimated policy 
reaction functions obtained using ex-post revised data can yield misleading 
descriptions of historical policy in the case of the United States. Central bankers 
take their decision based on real data. Sauer and Sturm (2007) show the 
stabilizing role of the ECB by using expectations as derived from survey results 
in Taylor rules. Similarly we estimate the following equations by using forward-
looking survey measures:  
 ttytt yai εβpiβpi +⋅+⋅+= )()(      (13) 
 ttlykt iyai ερβpiβρρ pi +⋅+⋅+⋅⋅−+⋅−= −1)]()([)1()1( .  (14) 
Inflation forecasts )( tpi are used based on a poll of a group of forecasters provided 
every month by Reuters. Concerning economic activity measures in the 
eurozone, the economic sentiment indicator (ESIN- ty ), which is a monthly 
composite index based on business and consumer surveys, is used. This index is 
published one to two months before industrial production statistics become 
available.11  
Within the GMM framework it is easy to check the importance of omitted 
variables in the policy rule. In fact, if there are such variables, then the 
orthogonality condition should be violated and the test for the validity of the 
instruments should then reject the null hypothesis. We concentrate on the 
importance of risk aversion or financial instability for the ECB explicitly related 
to its signalling role for future economic activity. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In the first step of our methodology the principal components of the risk 
premia of the six composite size and style indices portfolios (LG, MG, SG, LV, 
MV, SV) are calculated for the whole period from January 1999 to August 2007. 
The analysis shows that the first principal component has an eigenvalue greater 
than 1 and explains about 85 percent of the variation among the series (Table 1). 
We construct an indicator exactly like a weighted average of risk premia, the 
weighting being given by the principal component analysis.  
                                                 
11It comprises an industrial confidence indicator, a consumer confidence indicator, a construction 
confidence indicator and a retail trade confidence indicator. 
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
In order to assign an economic meaning to this indicator, Table 2 presents 
the correlation of this index with several economic variables like stock market 
returns, oil price changes, monetary aggregates changes and the implied volatility 
index from options. As can be easily indicated, there is a negative significant 
relation between this indicator and stock market returns and a positive relation 
with the volatility index. The latter relation is also presented clearly in Figure 2. 
There is also a negative relation with liquidity measures such as the change in 
monetary aggregates and a positive relation with the price of oil. All these can 
help us to interpret this indicator as the price of risk or in general as the 
investors’ risk aversion index (a similar methodology has been adopted by 
McGuire and Schrijvers, 2003; Sløk and Kennedy, 2004; Goudert and Gex, 
2006). 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Secondly, in order to estimate the VAR system of Eq. (10), unit root tests 
are performed on all the variables of interest. It is now well known that the 
augmented Dickey–Fuller and Phillips–Perron tests suffer from low power and 
size distortion, respectively. Based on the modified Z tests of Perron and Ng 
(1996), which have superior power and size properties, all the series are 
stationary in levels except the IPI index and the effective exchange rate.12 A 
VAR in levels is estimated since cointegration can be established.13  
We also calculate diagnostic tests on the residuals of the VAR. More 
specifically, the Jarque–Bera test about normality, the F statistic versions of the 
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 These results, not presented for economy of space, are available upon request from the authors. 
13
 Sims (1980) and Enders (1995) recommend against differencing time series, even if they are 
non-stationary, in order not to throw away information concerning long-term relationships. In 
addition our work is comparable with VAR literature on monetary transmission in the U.S. and 
Europe (among others, Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Peersman and Smets, 2001). 
Breush–Godfrey test (LM) for autocorrelation and the ARCH test (Engle, 1982) 
are applied. Generally speaking, there is no evidence against the null hypotheses 
(Ho: normality, Ho: no autocorrelation, Ho: no heteroskedasticity).  
The effect of changing risk aversion on the industrial production index is 
tested by applying impulse–response analysis. More specifically, the direction 
and the magnitude of this change are examined and compared with responses in 
the monetary policy variable. As can be seen in Figure 3, industrial production is 
very quick to respond to a 1 standard deviation increase in the risk aversion 
index, inducing a -0.25 percent drop in industrial production at the 3 month 
horizon. Moreover, this response has a magnitude similar to the response from a 
shock in the interest rate variable (EONIA). However, the latter response 
presents a delay and has a longer duration compared with the former. These days 
investors’ perceptions about risk from the stock market have an immediate effect 
on economic activity compared with the monetary policy variable. This result 
implies that central bankers should focus on investors’ risk aversion effects on 
economic activity and then apply a monetary policy in order to smooth these 
effects. So, investors’ risk aversion can be used as an additional signal when 
conducting monetary policy in order to affect economic activity.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Moreover, the response of industrial production to the risk aversion index 
is very similar in magnitude and duration to the response from shocks in the real 
exchange rate index. This similarity can also be explained by the fact that, these 
days, international investors play a crucial role in financial markets and 
consequently an important part of economic activity is funded by these investors.  
By looking at the response of the monetary variable to shocks in the other 
variables of the system we can say that the EONIA is very quick to respond to a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the industrial production index. The Central 
Bank reacts significantly to a risk aversion shock by reducing the interest rate in 
order to provide liquidity. Concerning the exact time taken for this action it can 
be easily understood that the effect of investors’ risk aversion on economic 
activity takes two to three months. This implies that the ECB cares about 
financial market stability and takes corrective actions in order to achieve it. This 
result is consistent with that of Mishkin and White (2002). The findings are 
similar when we estimate the VAR model by using the volatility index as an 
estimate of risk aversion (Figure 4). 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
By keeping in mind the Taylor rule, the reaction of the interest rate to 
past economic activity is in the right direction; however, it is not of the same 
magnitude as that expected from the rule. Similarly, the response of the 
“EONIA” to a shock in inflation confirms previous studies’ findings that the 
ECB’s interest rate setting is based on forward-looking variables rather than past 
information. 
In order to investigate further if the ECB takes into account shifts in 
investors’ risk preferences, we estimate the ECB interest rate reaction function 
based on a forward-looking Taylor rule. Table 3 contains the results of 
estimating Eq. (12) (Model 1a) and Eq. 14 (Model 2a) by using GMM and as 
instruments the lagged inflation, output gap and yield slope defined as the 
difference between the long-term Government Bond yield and the three-month 
treasury bill yield. These are the baseline models.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
However, the important effect of the risk aversion index on economic and 
financial activity indicates that there are serious theoretical and policy reasons 
for the Central Bank to monitor investors’ risk aversion measures, and the 
omission of the risk aversion index from the rule seems an obvious candidate for 
putting our testing procedure to work. We then re-estimate the baseline models 
by including up to three lagged risk aversion indexes in the set of instruments 
and we obtain the results in Table 3 in the columns entitled model 1b and model 
2b.  
As can be seen from the estimates of these equations, the ECB follows a 
stabilizing policy concerning inflation since βpi is higher than 1 and statistically 
significant. The Central Bank cares about economic activity and the values of the 
relevant parameter βy are near the Taylor rule suggestions. Moreover, it follows a 
smoothing interest rate setting, as can be concluded from the estimation of the ρ 
in all models. Models 2a,b present slightly higher adjusted R2 compared with 
Models 1a,b, indicating the importance of survey data in estimating the ECB 
reaction function. The ECB bases its decisions on expectations and survey data 
can be very useful in the interest rate setting. 
The point estimates of the parameters in Models 1b and 2b are slightly 
modified but the tests for validity of instruments do not reject the null, as can be 
seen in the J-statistic test results presented in the last row of Table 3. In the light 
of this evidence we can conclude that the shift in investors’ risk aversion affects 
the ECB behavior as the leading indicator of future economic activity but not as 
an independent argument for the monetary policy.   
 
5. Conclusions 
Following recent studies on the important role of the risk premia in 
economic activity in the U.S., this paper, following an asset pricing framework, 
decomposes risk premia into the quantity and price of risk. Risk aversion is often 
considered to correspond to the “price of risk” obtained in this way. 
Over the last years, there has been an increasing amount of literature that 
indicates an important relation between risk aversion indicators and financial 
instability. However, little attention is given to the relation between these 
indicators and real economic activity. 
The results from impulse response analysis presented here suggest that a 
shock in the risk aversion index has a negative effect on the industrial production 
index after three months and is similar to the exchange rate shock effect. The 
effect of a risk aversion shock on economic activity is quicker but is of the same 
magnitude as the monetary policy effect. Impulse response analysis indicates that 
the ECB seems to react to the risk aversion shock from financial markets by 
reducing the policy rate and providing liquidity. However, the duration of this 
providing liquidity may hide significant risks, as implied by the last financial 
crisis. 
Additionally, we provide evidence that, either assuming rational 
expectations and using a forward-looking specification or using expectations as 
derived from surveys, the ECB follows a stabilizing policy concerning inflation 
and economic activity. Investors’ risk aversion affects the ECB behavior as a 
leading indicator of future economic activity but not as an independent argument 
for the monetary policy.   
In conclusion, the Central Bank cares about financial stability mainly due 
to the increasing role of equity markets these days and the immediate effect of 
financial shocks on economic activity. In accordance with Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999) and Mishkin and White (2002), we provide evidence that the ECB views 
price stability and economic and financial stability as highly complementary and 
mutually consistent objectives to be pursued within a unified policy framework. 
However, the recent financial crisis indicates that offering significant liquidity 
may alter commercial bank perception of risk and thus increase systemic risk. 
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Tables 
Table 1 Principal component analysis of risk premia 
January 1999 - August 2007
Components 1 2 3 4 5 6
Eigenvalue 5.12 0.47 0.22 0.08 0.07 0.05
Variance Prop. 0.85 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
Cumulative Prop. 0.85 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00
Eigenvectors
Variable Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4 Vector 5 Vector 6
LG -0.40 0.54 0.30 0.48 -0.08 0.48
LV -0.41 -0.15 0.67 -0.40 0.42 -0.13
MG -0.42 0.35 -0.12 0.07 -0.26 -0.78
MV -0.41 -0.45 0.03 -0.21 -0.73 0.24
SG -0.41 0.25 -0.61 -0.48 0.29 0.29
SV -0.40 -0.55 -0.27 0.57 0.37 -0.06
 
Table 2 Correlation between common factor and economic variables 
1 DJ STOXX Total Market Index (TMI) -0.98
2 DJ EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX) 0.47
3 Industrial Production Index -0.07
4 Money growth (M3) -0.08
5 Slope yield curve -0.08
6 Price of Oil 0.11
 
All the variables are in first differences except variables 2 and 5. 
Table 3 Estimated forward-looking Taylor rules using GMM 
Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient Prob.  
ρ 0.910 0.00** 0.926 0.00** 0.955 0.00** 0.948 0.00**
constant -0.876 0.10* -1.193 0.07* -4.449 0.17 -3.841 0.18
βpi 2.251 0.00** 2.456 0.00** 4.386 0.02** 4.000 0.01**
βy 0.634 0.00** 0.534 0.00** 0.441 0.00** 0.393 0.00**
Obs. No. 74 74 101 101
Adjusted R-squared 0.981 0.981 0.982 0.982
Durbin-Watson stat 1.729 1.747 1.870 1.846
J-statistic (p-value) 0.82 0.86 0.52 0.55
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
 
Model 1a: Estimation of Eq. (12) using GMM with Newey–West heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
As instruments we use up to six months lagged inflation and up to three months lagged output gap, yield 
spread (ten-year Government Bonds; three-month Treasury Bills) and the interest rate corresponding to the 
data employed in the regression. Model 1b: Estimated as in Model 1a but as an additional instrument the up 
to three months lagged risk aversion index is used. Model 2a: Estimation of Eq. (14) using GMM with 
Newey–West heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. As instruments we use up to three months lagged 
inflation, output gap, yield spread (ten-year Government Bonds; three-month Treasury Bills), and the 
interest rate corresponding to the data employed in the regression. Model 2b: Estimated as in Model 2a but 
as additional instrument an up to three months lagged risk aversion index is used. 
 
Figures 
Figure 1 Inflation measures and oil prices 
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Figure 2 Risk aversion estimates 
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Figure 2 Response to Cholesky 1 S.D. innovations ± 2 S.E. 
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Note: We take the log levels of IPI, VSTOXX and the real exchange rate. 
 
Figure 3 Response to Cholesky 1 S.D. innovations ± 2 S.E. 
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Note: We take the log levels of IPI, VSTOXX and the real exchange rate. 
 
